ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű

Past Civil Law Workshops

Past workshops

In order to promote fundamental research in private law, the Québec Research Centre of Private and Comparative Law (now known as the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law) initiated the "Civil Law Workshop" series, bringing together jurists from Québec and beyond to work on related research topics. With their cross-disciplinary focus, the "Civil Law Workshops" contribute to enriching and stimulating fundamental research in private law.

The 2020-2022 series of Civil Law Workshops explored "Dis-enclosing private law".

The workshops were presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages from Justice Canada.

2020-2022 series - "Dis-enclosing private law"


Patrick Garon-Sayegh, "DĂ©confiner le droit privĂ© en le dramatisant : l’artisanat juridique mis en scĂšne et sous les projecteurs de Kenneth Burke"

March 31, 2023, 13:00-14:30 (EDT), 202 New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French Only) À tort ou Ă  raison, les pratiques mĂ©thodologiques disciplinent les milieux savants. Ces pratiques agissent autant Ă  titre prospectif que rĂ©trospectif. Elles orientent les recherches Ă  venir et dĂ©marquent celles qui devraient ĂȘtre retenues de celles qui devraient ĂȘtre Ă©cartĂ©s. Quoiqu'elles soient nĂ©cessaires, leur effet disciplinaire devient souvent un carcan confinant, autant pour les chercheurs que pour les objets qu'ils Ă©tudient.

Cette prĂ©sentation offre aux chercheurs en droit privĂ© une orientation mĂ©thodologique novatrice qui permet de dĂ©confiner — au moins en partie — leurs objets d'Ă©tude. Cette orientation, ancrĂ©e dans la perspective « dramatique » dĂ©veloppĂ©e par le rhĂ©toricien Kenneth Burke, invite les chercheurs en droit privĂ© Ă  se pencher sur le travail concret des acteurs juridiques. Lorsqu'adoptĂ©e, la perspective dramatique permet d'apprĂ©hender la dimension artisanale du droit privĂ© de maniĂšre « quasi-empirique » qui illumine les catĂ©gories doctrinales du droit privĂ© sous un nouvel angle tout en respectant la perspective dite « interne » suivant laquelle le sens de ces catĂ©gories relĂšve de pratiques interprĂ©tatives autonomes.

Patrick Garon-Sayegh est professeur adjoint Ă  la FacultĂ© de droit de l'UniversitĂ© de MontrĂ©al, oĂč il enseigne principalement le droit de la preuve civile et l'interprĂ©tation des lois. Ses recherches actuelles chevauchent le droit de la preuve et la responsabilitĂ© mĂ©dicale. Plus particuliĂšrement, il s'intĂ©resse aux pratiques argumentatives impliquĂ©es dans la preuve d'une faute mĂ©dicale et les affinitĂ©s philosophiques, historiques, et pratiques qui existent entre la justification mĂ©dicale et la justification juridique.


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Kirsten Anker and Tina Piper, "Codification and Mt Royal: Designing a Place for Precious Things"

February 24, 2022, 13:00 to 14:30,

30, ZoomCodification and urban planning were both central to the project of modernisation: humans and their lived spaces were subjected to the deliberate, rational design of a central authority in the name of progress, social hygiene and order. In examining the case of the contemporaneous drafting of the Civil Code of Lower Canada and the planning of Mt. Royal Park in the mid-1800s, we hope to show the specificities of how that modern project played out in colonial Quebec in a linguistically and legally plural society. We argue that the process of designating a park as a defined space for nature in the city has parallels in the designation of the code as the location of law with similar implications for the relationship between humans and their environment as for that between a people and their law.

Kirsten Anker is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű. She teaches property, legal theory and Aboriginal law/Indigenous legal traditions, with research interests extending also to evidence, dispute resolution, resource management and legal education. Her book Declarations of Interdependence: A Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights explores various aspects of claiming Native (Aboriginal) Title as a way to inspire a re-imagination of law. She has written widely on the challenge to orthodox understandings of law and sovereignty posed by the recognition in Australia and Canada that Indigenous law “intersects” or co-exists with state law, and draws on studies in legal theory, anthropology, Indigenous and occidental philosophy, translation and language. Current projects include work on Indigenous legal traditions in formal legal education, non-static digital mapping in land claims, the privatisation of Indigenous consultation, and ecological jurisprudence.

Tina Piper is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű. She teaches and researches in the areas of intellectual property law and legal history. She co-published a book entitled Putting Intellectual Property in its Place: Creative Labour and the Everyday (Oxford University Press) with Laura Murray and Kirsty Robertson. She was an IPLAI Resident Faculty Fellow from 2013 to 2015. She is a member of the Centre for Intellectual Property Policy (). Before joining ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű, she trained as a biomedical-electrical engineer and completed her doctorate of law at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. Tina also works with a number of community groups and has sat on the boards of POPMontreal, CKUT and Creative Commons Canada. She was an Action Canada Fellow (2005-2006). She has been a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada since 2004.


Richard Janda, "Vicarious Liability Deconfines Private Law"

21 January 2022, 13:00-14:40,

Flyer for Richard Janda, « Vicarious Liability Deconfines Private Law”Common law and civil law jurists seek to make clear what private law, and the law of extracontractual liability in particular, is confined to performing and doing. Famously Oliver Wendall Holmes, in The Common Law (1881) had stated that “The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune.” In this way he confined the very possibility of compensation through the notion that as a general matter it should not arise. Civilians confine the operation of the private law somewhat differently by viewing obligations as generally contractual – operating by the consent of those bound by them – and only exceptionally extending extra-contractually. But one way or the other, vicarious liability allows us to observe the private law deconfining its conception of fault in order to take account of the risk that moral persons create. In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada’s appeal to “public policy” in order to do so provides a point of entry into the deconfinement of private law.

Richard Janda is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű. He teaches extracontractual obligations, business associations, administrative process and environmental law. A former clerk to Justices Le Dain and Cory of the Supreme Court of Canada, he was also Director of the Center for the Study of Regulated Industries at ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű.

He is currently leading the Myko project (), which explores how to connect everyone to the environmental footprint of their choices in real time. He has written, among other things, on corporate social responsibility, digital law, and theories of justice.


GaĂ«le Gidrol-Mistral, "La mort d’un oxymore: la propriĂ©tĂ© collective"

5 November 2021, 13:00-14:30,

 la propriĂ©tĂ© collective"(In French Only) Sous l’effet de la montĂ©e des impĂ©ratifs collectifs et de la prise en considĂ©ration d’intĂ©rĂȘts altruistes, l’idĂ©e d’une propriĂ©tĂ© collective en droit civil se trouve ravivĂ©e au fil des tentatives d’éclatement du dogme individualiste de la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e et de la remise en cause de son caractĂšre fondamentalement Ă©goĂŻste. Pour autant, la propriĂ©tĂ© collective peine Ă  s’imposer dans l’imaginaire civiliste: tantĂŽt qualifiĂ©e de surannĂ©e, tantĂŽt phagocytĂ©e par la propriĂ©tĂ© individuelle, son caractĂšre plurivoque entraĂźne une certaine polysĂ©mie qui rend difficile l’apprĂ©hension de ce phĂ©nomĂšne juridique.

Ce n’est qu’en disant les mots et en explorant ses reprĂ©sentations conceptuelles que l’imaginaire rĂ©el de la propriĂ©tĂ© collective pourra ĂȘtre esquissĂ©.

GaĂ«le Gidrol-Mistral est professeure au DĂ©partement des sciences juridiques de la FacultĂ© de science politique et de droit de l’UQAM. Elle est Ă©galement directrice du Groupe de rĂ©flexion en droit privĂ© (GRDP). Elle enseigne le droit des biens et de la propriĂ©tĂ©, le droit des personnes et des biotechnologies, le droit des obligations et la mĂ©thodologie de la recherche juridique.

Ses recherches s’ancrent dans une perspective comparatiste et une analyse en termes de fondements du droit civil. À travers une Ă©tude des concepts et catĂ©gories du droit civil, elle s’intĂ©resse Ă  la fonction sociale du droit privĂ© et propose d’explorer et de bousculer les frontiĂšres existantes entre sujet et objet de droit, personne et corps, droit individuel et collectif, entitĂ©s humaines et non humaines notamment. Ses projets sur la copropriĂ©tĂ© ou la protection de l’environnement ouvrent un dialogue entre l’égoĂŻsme individuel de la propriĂ©tĂ© privĂ©e et l’altruisme collectif des communs et lui permettent d’envisager, Ă  cĂŽtĂ© de la propriĂ©tĂ© exclusive dominante, des formes plus sociales et solidaires de propriĂ©tĂ© ou de dĂ©tention des biens. Ceux sur l’embryon, le statut du corps humain, la circulation des produits de la reproduction, l’animal ou l’intelligence artificielle lui permettent de mesurer l’impact des nouvelles technologies sur les catĂ©gories et les concepts du droit civil.


Daniel Borrillo, "Déconfiner la bioéthique à la française : présentation critique de la derniÚre révision de la loi"

10 mars 2021, 13h00 Ă  14h30, webinar

(In French Only) Le dispositif bioĂ©thique français se caractĂ©rise par un fort interventionnisme de l’État aussi bien sur le contenu des normes que sur la mĂ©thode de crĂ©ation et de rĂ©vision lĂ©gislatives. Il suffit qu’une question soit considĂ©rĂ©e comme appartenant au domaine juridique de la bioĂ©thique pour qu’elle se trouve automatiquement soumise Ă  un traitement politique spĂ©cifique. C’est cette spĂ©cificitĂ© que l’on appelle « bioĂ©thique Ă  la française ». Construit sur le modĂšle de l’expertise articulĂ©e et contrĂŽlĂ©e par l’État, la loi bioĂ©thique apparaĂźt comme un rĂ©vĂ©lateur de l’impossibilitĂ© de la culture politique et juridique française Ă  faire confiance Ă  l’individu qui apparaĂźt rarement comme une source de crĂ©ativitĂ© et d’indĂ©pendance mais comme un ĂȘtre irresponsable, brutal et sans scrupule qui ne vise qu’à opprimer les autres et s’enrichir Ă  leurs dĂ©pens. C’est pourquoi, la bioĂ©thique n’est pas conçue pour informer, expliquer, clarifier les enjeux, mais plutĂŽt pour proscrire, censurer et se substituer aux personnes concernĂ©es. C’est aussi pourquoi, le dispositif bioĂ©thique est destinĂ© d’avantage Ă  l’établissement des limites et des bornes plutĂŽt qu’à l’élargissement du domaine des libertĂ©s offertes par la science, laquelle est prĂ©sentĂ©e de surcroit comme Ă©tant Ă  l’origine des nouvelles formes d’esclavage et d’aliĂ©nation.

Daniel Borrillo est enseignant-chercheur en droit privé à l'Université de Paris Nanterre et chercheur au CNRS (CERSA-Paris II Panthéon). Auteur de plusieurs ouvrages sur le droit de la bioéthique, la régulation des sexualités et le droit de la non-discrimination, il a participé à l'élaboration du Pacs et du mariage pour tous en France, de la loi sur l'identité de genre en Argentine et des politiques publiques d'égalité de genre et des sexualités pour la commission européenne.


Frédéric Zenati-Castaing, "La dimension savante de la codification"

10 February 2021 13:00-14:30, webinar

poster(In French Only) Cette confĂ©rence, dĂ©jĂ  donnĂ©e aux Ă©tudiants en doctorat de l'UniversitĂ© de Lyon, s'inscrit dans mes travaux sur la codification, sur la science du droit et sur le droit commun. Elle fait Ă©cho Ă  une autre confĂ©rence que j'avais donnĂ©e Ă  Mc Gill en 2012 dans le cadre du colloque Stateless law sous le titre "non ratione imperii, sed imperio rationis" (non pas par la force du pouvoir, mais par le pouvoir de la raison) pour montrer que la doctrine est une forme que peut prendre le droit sans Etat. Ce colloque m'avait fourni l'occasion de creuser les rapports entre science juridique d'une part, et loi et Etat d'autre part. Il m'avait conduit Ă  mettre en Ă©vidence la rivalitĂ© qui existe entre le droit savant, source qui rĂ©gnait avant la codification, et le droit Ă©tatique qui est devenu la rĂšgle depuis lors. J'avais avancĂ© l'hypothĂšse d'un retour de l'hĂ©gĂ©monie de la science du droit avec l'avĂšnement des codifications savantes du XXe et du XXIe siĂšcle et la mondialisation. La prĂ©sente confĂ©rence poursuit la rĂ©flexion en avançant, Ă  partir des donnĂ©es de l'histoire comparative, l'hypothĂšse que la codification lĂ©gislative par laquelle l'Etat a accaparĂ© le droit depuis le XVIIIe siĂšcle et a dĂ©possĂ©dĂ© la science juridique n'est, en rĂ©alitĂ©, intrinsĂšquement qu'un avatar de l'Ɠuvre savante, que la codification est, par essence, savante. Elle l'est en ce qu'elle est rĂ©vĂ©lation d'un droit transcendant (droit divin, droit naturel, droit commun
), mission qu'a toujours remplie la science du droit dans toutes les traditions juridiques oĂč elle existe. C'est parce que les droits coutumiers ne reposent pas sur la transcendance qu'ils ont ni science du droit, ni codes.

FrĂ©dĂ©ric Zenati-Castaing est professeur des facultĂ©s de droit en France. Il enseigne Ă  l’UniversitĂ© de Lyon le droit civil, les sources du droit, le droit comparĂ© et la philosophie du droit. Il a fondĂ© l’école doctorale de droit privĂ© de l’UniversitĂ© Jean Moulin. Il a Ă©tĂ© membre du Conseil national des universitĂ©s de 1999 Ă  2003. Il a crĂ©Ă© Ă  l’UniversitĂ© de Lyon un diplĂŽme doctoral portant sur l’étude fondamentale du droit privĂ©, diplĂŽme aujourd’hui devenu un master de recherches, qu’il dirige depuis lors.


Marianne Faure-Abbad (UniversitĂ© de Poitiers), "L’influence du droit de l’environnement sur le droit civil: instrumentalisation ou Ă©cologisation? "

2 December 2020, 13:00-14:30, webinar

poster(In French only) D’abord travaillĂ© par les spĂ©cialistes de droit public par le prisme des sources du droit, le droit de l’environnement a conquis le droit privĂ© jusqu’à disposer aujourd’hui d’un ancrage puissant dans le Code civil français qui contient, depuis la loi pour la reconquĂȘte de la biodiversitĂ© du 8 aoĂ»t 2016, un titre consacrĂ© Ă  la rĂ©paration du prĂ©judice Ă©cologique (pur). SituĂ© en clĂŽture des textes rĂ©gissant la responsabilitĂ© civile extracontractuelle, ce rĂ©gime de rĂ©paration du prĂ©judice Ă©cologique est tellement Ă©loignĂ© des principes qui gouvernent la rĂ©paration des dĂ©lits civils, que son importation dans le Code civil interroge ses impacts sur les contours, les concepts, les conditions de la responsabilitĂ© civile.

D’un point de vue plus gĂ©nĂ©ral, la confĂ©rence s’attachera Ă  montrer dans un premier mouvement comment le droit de l’environnement recourt aux concepts du droit civil comme des outils au service des objectifs qu’il poursuit. Typiquement, l’obligation d’information dans les contrats permet, dans le Code de l’environnement français, d’assurer la mĂ©moire du passif environnemental des terres, renouvelant ainsi le rĂŽle qu’on lui connaĂźt en droit des contrats dans la protection du consentement. Dans un second mouvement, il s’agira d’apprĂ©cier les impacts de la privatisation du droit de l’environnement sur les concepts du droit civil : la responsabilitĂ© civile bien sĂ»r, mais aussi la distinction des personnes et des choses et le droit des biens.

Marianne Faure-Abbad est professeure Ă  l’UniversitĂ© de Poitiers, 1re vice doyenne de la FacultĂ© de droit, chargĂ©e de la recherche et codirectrice du Master II Droit de l’urbanisme et de la construction. Auteure d’une thĂšse de doctorat sur Le fait gĂ©nĂ©rateur de la responsabilitĂ© contractuelle. Contribution Ă  la thĂ©orie de l’inexĂ©cution du contrat, prĂ©f. Philippe Remy (Presses universitaires juridiques Poitiers-LGDJ 2003), elle enseigne aujourd’hui spĂ©cifiquement le droit de la construction immobiliĂšre, discipline dans laquelle elle publie des travaux pĂ©dagogiques et scientifiques.

Elle dirige depuis plusieurs annĂ©es, avec le prof. Michel Boudot, les journĂ©es d’études annuelles Poitiers-Roma Tre « Jean Beauchard-Paolo Maria Vecchi », qui s’inscrivent dans la perspective de recherche historico-comparative de l’Equipe de recherche en droit privĂ© de la FacultĂ© de droit et des sciences sociales.

The 2016-2018 series of Civil Law Workshops explored « Les influences en droit privé ».

The workshops were presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages from Justice Canada.

Each workshop was accredited for 1.5 hours of continuing legal education by the Barreau du Québec.

Workshops ofÌę2018-2020 series - « Les influences en droit privĂ© »


Sarah Worthington (Cambridge University), “The Power of property in Private Law”

29 March 2019, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

This lecture will address the reliance that the common law, and equity in particular, place on the idea of property, and in particular what is achieved by that reliance. Of course the practical power of the trust and all that it enables in both commercial and domestic settings is well known. But I want also to move beyond that feature and address the notion that reliance on the idea of property enables difficult policy choices to be injected into judicial decisions in an astonishingly subliminal way.

Property law has the reputation for being politically neutral and doctrinally rigorous, with any practical conclusions following from the very nature of things rather than requiring any normative assessment. That view appears flawed. This is an idea I have addressed periodically, but it seems apt to revisit it in the context of this series of lectures.

Yvette Rachel Kalieu Elongo (School of Law & Political Sciences, University of Dschang), "Le droit OHADA et la distinction droit civil / droit commercial: quelles influences?"

8 February 2019, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) L’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des affaires (OHADA) est une organisation sous-rĂ©gionale regroupant 17 États de l’Afrique subsaharienne qui s’est donnĂ©e pour objectif d’assurer l’intĂ©gration et le dĂ©veloppement des États membres par le droit. Elle a, Ă  cet effet, adoptĂ© des actes uniformes couvrant diffĂ©rents domaines tels que le droit des sĂ»retĂ©s, le droit commercial, les voies d’exĂ©cution qui relĂšvent habituellement soit du droit civil, soit du droit commercial.

En regroupant ainsi, sous le couvert du droit des affaires, un ensemble de matiĂšres que l’on rattache traditionnellement au droit civil ou au droit commercial, le droit OHADA semble dĂ©passer et contribuer d’une certaine maniĂšre Ă  relativiser la distinction somme toute doctrinale et parfois thĂ©orique, entre le droit civil et le droit commercial.

L’uniformisation recherchĂ©e des rĂšgles du droit dans l’espace OHADA et le souci d’une application uniforme de celles-ci, avec la mise en place d’une cour commune, semblent avoir pris le pas, pour les fondateurs du droit OHADA, sur la distinction droit civil et droit commercial. L’OHADA s’intĂ©resse surtout Ă  la finalitĂ© Ă©conomique de la rĂšgle. Il est vrai que l’on peut, sur certains aspects, s’interroger sur la pertinence de ce dĂ©passement et ses limites en se demandant si l’OHADA peut durablement s’affranchir de cette distinction. D’un autre cĂŽtĂ©, on pourrait se demander si l’approche retenue par le droit OHADA ne peut pas influencer d’une certaine maniĂšre la distinction et amener Ă  s’interroger sur la pertinence de la distinction droit civil/ droit commercial aujourd’hui.

SĂ©bastien Pimont (Sciences Po), “Penser les influences du droit civil : s'en dĂ©barrasser, les accepter toutes”

1 November 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 16, Old Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) Cet atelier se propose d’étudier le droit civil commeÌęun rapport d’influenceÌęentre un Ă©lĂ©ment technique et un Ă©lĂ©ment politique. Une telle approche permet d’isoler ces Ă©lĂ©ments tout en pensant leur action rĂ©ciproque ainsi que leur relativitĂ©.

Le droit civil existe, ainsi, comme une Ă©criture particuliĂšre, tel est son Ă©lĂ©ment technique. Un moyen au service d’une fin politique : un mode d’exposition d’un projet de sociĂ©tĂ©, indĂ©pendamment de la nature de ce dernier.

Ceci posĂ©, nous dĂ©velopperons l’hypothĂšse selon laquelle il est possible de concevoir le droit civil comme pouvant assurer la coexistence formelle, la coprĂ©sence pacifique de plusieurs projets politiques dans une sociĂ©tĂ© unique mais pluraliste.

Afin d’y parvenir, cet atelier entend dĂ©velopper successivement les points suivants : 1. Isoler l’élĂ©ment politique du droit civil; 2. Formaliser son Ă©lĂ©ment technique; 3. Concevoir ce dernier comme (pouvant peut-ĂȘtre ĂȘtre) l’instrument d’une thĂ©orie de la justice adaptĂ©e au fait pluraliste de nos sociĂ©tĂ©s contemporaines.

Omar Farahat (ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű),Ìę“Morality in Islamic Commercial Law Theory”

26 October 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

This workshop investigates the place of moral considerations in shaping classical Islamic views on commerce and commercial law. The relation between morality and law is a question that received much attention in modern jurisprudence, and is often used as a framework for analyzing the Islamic legal tradition.

Nonetheless, not much has been said on the place of moral ideas in shaping laws governing commercial exchanges in either tradition. While, in modern law, it is sometimes claimed that positive morality is squarely opposed to capitalist-driven commercial laws, studies on Islamic commerce tend to either offer descriptive accounts of the law, or a historical narrative of economic stagnation.

This workshop, by contrast, will discuss the moral frameworks constructed by a number of classical Muslim thinkers to allow a conceptualization of commercial activity and a formulation broad principles that make sense of Islamic legal regulation of commerce.

The talk will make two central claims. Internally, Islamic commercial law theory viewed morality as an effective yardstick against which the validity of transactions could be measured. Externally, the anchoring of law in a metaphysical view of morality allowed for a more pervasive and multi-layered intervention of moral ideas in commercial regulation than generally assumed in modern works on commercial law theory.

The 2016-2018 series of Civil Law Workshops explored « Le public en droit privĂ©Ìę».

The workshops were presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages from Justice Canada.

Each workshop was accredited for 1.5 hours of continuing legal education by the Barreau du Québec.

Workshops of 2016-2018Ìęseries - « Le public en droit privĂ© »


Frederik Swennen, University of Antwerp - “The Public in Family Law: Channelling Parents to be Each Other’s Intimate Partners?”

4 November 2016, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

The disconnect between marriage and parenthood (Parsons 1916) seems acquis in 21C family law. Particularly, filiation can be established with full effect vis-à-vis parents who are not, and never were, each other’s intimate partners.

The first purpose of this Workshop, however, is to unveil that parenthood still is much dependent on the existence of a(n) (former) intimate partnership between the parents, e.g. in adoption law (art. 555 CCQ) or in the exercise of parental authority (art. 372 CCF). Function merely seems to have replaced form.

The second purpose is to normatively discuss the above in light of the “channelling function” of family law (Schneider 1992), aiming to direct people into accepted social institutions that exert performative effects. Is there a State interest to direct parents towards certain intimate practices, if not institutions? Alternatively, is there a State interest in developing a non-intimate parenthood status between parents (Weiner 2015)?

The Workshop will draw on family studies and on Quebec and Low Countries’ family law.


Vincent Forray, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű - “La raison publique du droit des contrats”

25 November 2016, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) Le contrat est une affaire privĂ©e. Par dĂ©finition et par excellence. Les parties s’obligent elles-mĂȘmes au terme d’un accord de volontĂ©s. Le cƓur du rĂ©gime contractuel est constituĂ© de rĂšgles et principes qui suivent la logique d’une telle conceptionÌę: libre choix des parties quant Ă  la forme et au contenu de leur contrat, force obligatoire Ă  la mesure du consentement, effet relatif des conventions, privilĂšge de la volontĂ© des contractants dans l’opĂ©ration d’interprĂ©tation


D’un autre cĂŽtĂ©, le contrat est aussi une affaire publique. En effet, le droit civil prĂ©voit des mĂ©canismes de contrĂŽle de la gestion privĂ©e des transactions. Classiquement, ces mĂ©canismes prennent la forme de limitations aux rĂšgles et principes Ă©voquĂ©s plus haut. Toutefois, le fait nouveau tient Ă  l’institution d’une vĂ©ritable police des comportements des contractantsÌę: clause gĂ©nĂ©rale de bonne foi, obligations connexes aux prestations et contenus dĂ©terminĂ©s par les parties, dispositifs de rĂ©Ă©quilibrage de la relation contractuelle, surveillance de certains pouvoirs


En sorte que le droit des contrats vit au fil d’une tension entre deux types de raison ou de rationalitĂ©. Cet atelier sera l’occasion d’étudier plus profondĂ©ment cette tension afin de concevoir, et peut-ĂȘtre d’ouvrir, certaines perspectives d’évolution en la matiĂšre.


Michelle Cumyn, UniversitĂ© Laval - “Le droit privĂ© et les formes actuelles de gouvernance publique”

27 January 2017, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only)Les manifestations contemporaines du public en droit privĂ© traduisent des mouvements contradictoires et entraĂźnent une remise en question de son rĂŽle. Deux formes actuelles de la gouvernance publique sont abordĂ©esÌę: les interventions lĂ©gislatives dans les rapports juridiques privĂ©s et la contractualisation de l’action publique.

Les derniers siĂšcles ont vu le droit Ă©tatique s’immiscer toujours davantage dans les rapports juridiques privĂ©s. Les lois et les rĂšglements assortis de sanctions pĂ©nales sont considĂ©rĂ©s «Ìęd’ordre publicÌę»Ìę: le droit privĂ© est donc tenu d’en assurer la sanction. Il est moins portĂ© Ă  dĂ©velopper ses mĂ©canismes propres. On assiste Ă  une «ÌępublicisationÌę» du droit privĂ©.

De source coutumiĂšre, le droit privĂ© a d’abord Ă©tĂ© conçu comme obligatoire. L’essor du contrat a coĂŻncidĂ© avec un renversement de son rĂŽleÌę: d’impĂ©ratif, il est devenu essentiellement supplĂ©tif. Aujourd’hui plus que jamais, l’autonomie de la volontĂ© fonde les rapports juridiques privĂ©s. Paradoxalement, les contrats d’adhĂ©sion et autres formulaires sont lĂ©gion. On pourrait parler d’une «ÌęprivatisationÌę» du droit privĂ©.

Le dĂ©ploiement simultanĂ© de ces tendances opposĂ©es s’explique par la tension entre protection et libertĂ©. Le mouvement s’enchaĂźne et s’accĂ©lĂšre, au point oĂč l’on peut se questionner sur l’efficacitĂ© des interventions lĂ©gislatives ponctuelles. Serait-il prĂ©fĂ©rable de rĂ©tablir le droit privĂ© dans son rĂŽle, en renforçant son caractĂšre obligatoire?

En droit public, le modĂšle de la loi fait l’objet de critiques, et l’État a souvent recours au contrat comme outil d’élaboration et de mise en Ɠuvre de cadres normatifs. La contractualisation de l’action publique emprunte des formes trĂšs diverses, qui vont bien au-delĂ  de la figure familiĂšre du contrat administratif. Cette mouvance s’explique par la volontĂ© de rendre l’action publique plus lĂ©gitime et plus efficace.

Du point de vue du droit privĂ©, la rĂ©fĂ©rence au contrat s’avĂšre ambigĂŒe. Il est difficile de se prononcer sur le caractĂšre juridiquement contraignant des ententes, sur leur validitĂ© et sur leurs effets. Quelles conclusions faut-il tirer de l’insuffisance du droit privĂ© en cette matiĂšre?


Éric Millard, UniversitĂ© Paris Ouest Nanterre La DĂ©fense - “Droit privĂ©/droit public : quelques enjeux d'une distinction doctrinale”

6 February 2017, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) La distinction public/privĂ©, particuliĂšrement en droit, est frĂ©quemment conçue comme une summa divisio, une distinction essentielle, structurante et parfois naturelle. Dans cette intervention, on souhaiterait montrer que si elle est ainsi dans la tradition juridique, continentale d'abord (affirmation qui peut se nuancer), c'est essentiellement parce qu'elle est construite ainsi par la doctrine juridique elle-mĂȘme, particuliĂšrement la doctrine acadĂ©mique, tant dans ses productions scientifiques ou dogmatiques, que dans son apprĂ©hension des modalitĂ©s de construction et transmission des savoirs.

En mobilisant les outils théoriques de l'analyse métadoctrinale, cette position sera illustrée par l'étude de deux questions importantes dans le cas français : la question de la constitutionnalisation (publicisation) du droit privé, par l'instauration d'un contrÎle de constitutionnalité dans ses différentes versions (contrÎle a priori et question prioritaire de constitutionnalité) et celle de la « privatisation » du droit européen communautaire.


Pascale Cornut St-Pierre, University of Ottawa (Civil Law Section) - “L’évitement fiscal vu sous l’angle du droit civilÌę: le privĂ© est politique!”

10 March 2017, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) La libertĂ© de principe accordĂ©e aux individus en droit des contrats et en droit commercial s’est muĂ©e, en pratique, en une libertĂ© de crĂ©ation des formes juridiques qui pose aujourd’hui d’importants dĂ©fis d’ordre public. Alors que ces dĂ©fis sont le plus souvent abordĂ©s sous l’angle du droit public, comme un problĂšme d’effectivitĂ© de l’intervention de l’État dans les affaires privĂ©es, j’aimerais suggĂ©rer que le droit privĂ© peut Ă©galement contribuer Ă  la solution d’un tel problĂšme. J’illustrerai mon propos en me penchant sur l’un des grands enjeux de notre Ă©poque, qui relĂšve de toute Ă©vidence du droit public : l’évitement fiscal. Face Ă  la complexification croissante non seulement des rĂ©gimes fiscaux, mais aussi des structures juridiques employĂ©es dans la vie des affaires, le droit privĂ© peut agir Ă  la racine du problĂšme en confĂ©rant, par ses techniques de qualification, une intelligibilitĂ© accrue aux rapports juridiques que nouent entre elles les parties privĂ©es, simplifiant d’autant l’application des rĂšgles fiscales.


Catherine Kessedjian, UniversitĂ© PanthĂ©on-Assas and Wainwright Senior Fellow, Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű - "Le droit privĂ© au service de la protection d'intĂ©rĂȘts publics"

7 April 2017, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) Prenant place dans le cycle de confĂ©rences intitulĂ© « Le public en droit privĂ© », cette communication part d’une dĂ©finition large de la notion de « public » pour y inclure les intĂ©rĂȘts collectifs de la sociĂ©tĂ© dans son ensemble ou, Ă  tout le moins, de parties d’entre elle que l’on appellera, pour simplifier, des « communautĂ©s ».

Traditionnellement, il appartient Ă  l’État de protĂ©ger ces intĂ©rĂȘts collectifs ou publics par les diffĂ©rents moyens qui sont Ă  sa disposition : la lĂ©gislation, la force publique, les actions de droit public, les actions pĂ©nales, etc.

Or, force est de constater que l’État n’a plus les moyens de ses ambitions. Moyens matĂ©riels tout d’abord (les budgets des États sont mis Ă  mal par la rĂ©sistance Ă  l’impĂŽt, notamment). Moyens politiques, ensuite (la lĂ©gitimitĂ© politique des gouvernements est contestĂ©e). Moyens intellectuels, enfin (le personnel politique, comme la sociĂ©tĂ© dans son ensemble, fait face Ă  ce qu’il est dĂ©sormais convenu d’appeler un « illettrisme fonctionnel »).

C’est pourquoi, la place des actions en justice civiles dĂ©lictuelles ou contractuelles pour dĂ©fendre et protĂ©ger les intĂ©rĂȘts collectifs va grandissante, phĂ©nomĂšne que les États-uniens appellent le « private enforcement », expression anglaise que l’on retrouve de plus en plus dans la doctrine francophone.

Ce phĂ©nomĂšne sera explicitĂ© grĂące Ă  deux exemples : les actions en dommages et intĂ©rĂȘts pour violation des rĂšgles du droit antitrust (droit des ententes anti-concurrentielles) et les actions pour violation des droits fondamentaux par les entreprises.


Patrick Forget, UniversitĂ© du QuĂ©bec Ă  MontrĂ©al - "L’atteinteÌę: donation Ă  charge (ou cadeau empoisonnĂ©) du droit public au droit commun de la responsabilitĂ© civile"

6 October 2017, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only)ÌęJusqu'Ă  l’insertion de la Charte canadienne dans la Constitution, la Charte quĂ©bĂ©coise, pour l’ambitieux catalogue de droits qu'elle est, se faisait remarquer pour l'Ă©conomie de ses effets.

L’arrivĂ©e de la Charte canadienne et ses suites jurisprudentielles ont Ă©tĂ© un don de transfiguration pour la Charte quĂ©bĂ©coise, qui, comme vivifiĂ©e par ce souffle primordial, a imposĂ©, si ce n'est peut-ĂȘtre pas l'entiĂšretĂ© de son rĂ©gime, au moins sa prĂ©sence et ses concepts, notamment le concept d'atteinte, au droit commun de la responsabilitĂ© civile. Ìę

Dans cette confĂ©rence, nous tenterons de montrer que ce don du droit public n’est pas gratuit. L’intĂ©gration raisonnĂ©e du concept d’atteinte dans la responsabilitĂ© civile exige un travail de dĂ©finition du concept d’atteinte lui-mĂȘme ainsi qu’un travail de recensement des bouleversements que le concept d’atteinte engendre (ou est susceptible d’engendrer) dans l’architecture du rĂ©gime de responsabilitĂ© civile.

Nombreux sont les juristes qui ont contribuĂ© jusqu’à prĂ©sent Ă  cette rĂ©flexion. Si nous leur sommes infiniment redevable, nous pensons que notre apport se dĂ©marque fondamentalement par la grande mĂ©fiance (mĂȘlĂ©e tout de mĂȘme de fascination) que nous inspire le concept d’atteinte. Ìę Ìę


John Borrows, University of Victoria - "UsingÌęPrivate Law Models to Revitalize Indigenous Law:ÌęAnishinaabe Law and Dispute Resolution - A Proposal"

19 January 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

In some jurisdictions,ÌęprivateÌęarbitrationÌęprocesses allow parties to resolve disputes by constructing their own choice of forum and guiding laws. This paper will consider how Indigenous peoples might revitalize their own legal traditions through voluntary fora where Indigenous processes and principles guide dispute resolution.Ìę


Vanja Hamzić, SOAS, University of London -Ìę "A Renaissance interrupted?: Personhood, ‘Sodomy’ and the Public in Twelfth-Century Christian and Islamic Proto-Civil Legality"

27 March 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

The eventful twelfth century was, in many ways, a veritable paradox. On the one hand, it saw a sudden surge in academic works and universities in Western and Southern Europe that sought to bridge the worlds previously thought entirely incommensurable and usher in an age of scholasticism that would eventually lead to the fourteenth- to seventeenth-century Renaissance. For this reason, it has been a staple of mediaevalist scholarship for quite some time now to describe those thorough-going changes as the ‘renaissance of the twelfth century’. On the other hand, the same century also reads as a striking catalogue of most violent acts and disasters: from the rise of inquisition and merciless Christian infighting, over the first expulsions of Jews and the intensification of the Reconquista on Muslim Spain to the blood and gore of the Second, Third and German Crusades. Might it not be more appropriate, then, to characterise this period as an age of profound crisis, in which the true contours of a ‘persecuting society’ were drawn?

This talk seeks to make a modest contribution to that debate, by guiding the audience’s attention to a tell-tale public aspect of high mediaeval life—that of sexual and gender diversity—and by expanding the view over the twelfth century so as to include the affairs in the Great Seljuk Empire (1037–1194), a vast Turko-Persianate SunnÄ« Muslim state that originated in Anatolia but quickly came to rule over much of the then Islamicate world. The talk considers, in particular, an unlikely rise of neo-Roman European civil law and Seljuk proto-civil legality and its formidable effect on two paradigmatic twelfth-century intellectual debates on the public, legal and theological standing of ‘sodomy’ (peccatum sodomiticum, liwāáč­): one in amongst prominent Benedictines and the other between the leading កanafÄ« scholars. It is argued that these debates, led in the distinct spirit of concordia discors (discordant harmony) or ikhtilāf (permissible scholarly disagreement), are indispensable for our understanding of legal and social aspects of sexual and gender diversity in the twelfth century and, in turn, the way in which certain rapturous pluralities were continued and ruptured—concomitantly.


Celia Fassberg,ÌęHebrew University of Jerusalem - "The Public in Private International Law"

2 March 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

The vindication of private rights in a cross-border situation introduces a series of questions that have to be considered in addition to the traditional private law analysis familiar from domestic situations. Who can sue and who can be sued in a local court, and for what? Should local or foreign law apply? What assistance should a local court give a foreign court? What is the local significance of a foreign judicial decision?Ìę These questions are quite distinct from the private law analysis and they inevitably touch - directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly - on public interests of both local and foreign sovereigns. It is then not surprising that while designed to facilitate the enforcement of private rights, private international law demonstrates a preoccupation with the appropriate weight to be attached to local and foreign public interests and the appropriate way in which to express them. It should be no more surprising that the sense of what is appropriate should fluctuate with changes in the relationship between public and private law and changes in the relationship between states. The presentation will explore different manifestations of this preoccupation with the “public” in each area of private international law (jurisdiction, choice of law, foreign judgments, and legal assistance to foreign courts), drawing on methodological and doctrinal examples of attempts to assert or to suppress local public concerns, to repel or to admit foreign public intrusions.


Richard Janda, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű - "La raison privĂ©e en droit constitutionnel"

23 March 2018, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

(In French only) La constitution est une affaire publique. Par dĂ©finition et par excellence. On peut mĂȘme aller jusqu’à affirmer que le public, composĂ© de citoyens, n’existe pas sans le cadre constitutionnel. Le cƓur de ce rĂ©gime public consiste Ă  confĂ©rer des pouvoirs Ă  des fonctions du gouvernement et d’identifier des principes pour la sĂ©lection des autoritĂ©s qui occupent ces fonctions. Les pouvoirs ainsi instaurĂ©s peuvent ĂȘtre rĂ©ciproquement restreints selon la protection des droits et libertĂ©s des citoyens. L’idĂ©e reçue depuis Rawls est que la raison publique soutient un rĂ©gime constitutionnel bien ordonnĂ© puisque c’est Ă  travers elle que les principes constitutionnels peuvent se justifier et Ă©ventuellement ĂȘtre acceptĂ©s par la diversitĂ© des individus auxquels ces principes sont vouĂ©s Ă  s’appliquer.

Toutefois, Kant, le maitre Ă  penser de Rawls, a reconnu le rĂŽle clef de la raison privĂ©e dans la prĂ©servation des ordres constitutionnels. Dans son court texte cĂ©lĂšbre, «ÌęQu’est-ce que les LumiĂšres?Ìę» il distingue entre la raison publique exercĂ©e devant un public qui lit, et la raison privĂ© exercĂ©e dans un poste civil ou dans l’exercice d’une fonction confiĂ©e. LĂ  oĂč l’on obĂ©it Ă  des obligations de la constitution, on exerce, selon Kant, la raison privĂ©e.

Le fond obligatoire de la Constitution cĂšde, donc, Ă  une raison privĂ©e qui d’une part peut limiter l’étendue de sa prĂ©tendue raison publique. Par exemple, si l’obĂ©issance Ă  l’ordre constitutionnel exclut la reconnaissance du rĂŽle des ainĂ©es autochtones dans «Ìęle gouvernementÌę», la raison privĂ©e rĂ©ussit Ă  primer sur la raison publique et Ă  exclure des Ă©lĂ©ments justificatifs possibles. En effet, la Constitution en tant que contrat social exclut du lien contractuel certains peuples et leurs traditions qui, traditionnellement, ne formaient pas «Ìęle publicÌę». Le champ des obligations est ainsi rĂ©trĂ©ci.Ìę

D’autre part, la raison privĂ©e peut rendre imputable l’exercice de la raison publique en crĂ©ant des obligations autour de ses principes et Ă©noncĂ©s. ÌęPar exemple, on pourrait se servir des obligations extracontractuelles qui entourent le contrat social constitutionnel pour reconnaitre une responsabilitĂ© civile pour la faute Ă©tatique qui cause prĂ©judice Ă  la terre par sa nĂ©gligence dans l’AnthropocĂšne (voir l’affaire Urgenda du tribunalÌędu district deÌęLaÌęHaye). Le champ des obligations serait ainsi Ă©largi.

De sorte que le droit constitutionnel s’articule dans une tension entre la raison publique et la raison privĂ©e. Cet atelier sera l’occasion d’étudier plus profondĂ©ment cette tension, afin de concevoir la perturbation qu’engendre la raison privĂ©e dans la raison publiqueÌę et vice versa, et peut-ĂȘtre d’ouvrir la possibilitĂ© d’une transformation de la matiĂšre.

Ìę

The 2014-2016 series of Civil Law Workshops explored « L'abnégation en droit civil ».

The workshops were presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages.

Each workshop was accredited for 1.5 hours of continuing legal education by the Barreau du Québec.


Thierry Nootens, UQTR - L’abnĂ©gation comme fondement de l’ordre juridique et social : l'expĂ©rience des femmes mariĂ©es du QuĂ©bec, 1866-1930

20 November 2015, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

De l'entrĂ©e en vigueur duÌęCode civil du Bas-CanadaÌę(1866) Ă  la Crise des annĂ©es 30, l'abnĂ©gation fĂ©minine constitue l'un des piliers de l'ordre social au QuĂ©bec. Le sacrifice de soi, doublĂ© de l'obligation d'obĂ©issance, figure alors en bonne place dans le droit positif, les rĂ©alitĂ©s familiales et la morale promue par les groupes dominants. Bref, l'abnĂ©gation fait systĂšme, du point de vue des rapports entre droit et sociĂ©tĂ©. Des causes rapportĂ©es et des procĂšs ordinaires permettent de mieux comprendre comment le fait de « prendre sur soi » a Ă©tĂ© vĂ©cu par les femmes mariĂ©es en diverses circonstances (problĂšmes financiers, ruptures conjugales, etc.) et de rendre compte de sa rĂ©gulation par la magistrature. Les juges, comme nous le verrons, Ă©taient partagĂ©s entre leur volontĂ© de sĂ©vir Ă  l'Ă©gard des Ă©pouses oublieuses de leurs devoirs et la nĂ©cessitĂ© de secourir des femmes confrontĂ©es Ă  des situations intolĂ©rables. Si on ne peut pas tirer de leçons pour le temps prĂ©sent Ă  partir de ce matĂ©riel, ce chapitre de l'histoire des femmes permet nĂ©anmoins de rĂ©flĂ©chir Ă  un enjeu bien contemporain, celui de la juridicisation et judiciarisation des rapports sociaux. La faible institutionnalisation de la vie sociale, avant l'apparition de l'État providence, faisait en sorte que le droit et la justice prĂ©sentaient une concrĂ©tude immĂ©diate pour les populations, rĂ©alitĂ© dont le parcours des femmes en difficultĂ© tĂ©moigne Ă©loquemment.


Alexandra Braun, University of Oxford - Selflessness in the context of testamentary gift-giving: The case of testamentary promises

30 October 2015, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

This paper investigates the role selflessness and more specifically altruism is playing in the context of testamentary gift-giving, with a particular focus on testamentary promises. It investigates the motives behind testamentary gifts and, especially, promises to benefit someone on death, by drawing on findings, of economists, anthropologists and sociologists.

The paper explores the nature of such promises and the consequences that ensue when they are broken, and questions whether and, to what extent the motives should influence how lawmakers perceive and tackle cases in which the promisee has relied upon the promise.


Dot Reid, University of Glasgow - Inheritance and Family Values

2 October 2015, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

The law of succession is on the reform agenda in the UK. Before the law was changed for England and Wales in 2014, the Law Commission worked with researchers to conduct a large survey of public attitudes.

Despite extensive social change and the acceptance of many different forms of being 'family', the nuclear family reigns supreme in attitudes towards inheritance. The Scottish government has now proposed making significant changes.

This workshopÌę will discuss recent developments in light of recent research and will examine the broader values underpinning inheritance in terms of government policy and public attitudes.


Lisa CarayonLisa Carayon , UniversitĂ© Paris 1 PanthĂ©on-Sorbonne: "Les femmes et la reproduction en droit français : l’abnĂ©gation forcĂ©e"

Friday, 20 mars 2015, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Le terme d’abnĂ©gation semble ĂȘtre utilisĂ© de deux façons distinctes en droit français. Dans la sphĂšre publique, il renvoie principalement aux hommes, dans leur rapport Ă  l’État et Ă  la Nation. Dans la sphĂšre privĂ©e en revanche, il est utilisĂ© pour dĂ©signer des femmes, notamment dans leurs relations familiales.

Les femmes se retrouvent pourtant souvent dans la situation de devoir s’oublier dans l’intĂ©rĂȘt commun : c’est le cas notamment dans le domaine de la reproduction. Le droit français organise ainsi un systĂšme dans lequel l’intĂ©rĂȘt des femmes, la sauvegarde de leur santĂ©, leur volontĂ© personnelle, la maĂźtrise de leurs corps, sont, sinon niĂ©s, du moins placĂ©s au second plan face Ă  des impĂ©ratifs considĂ©rĂ©s comme supĂ©rieurs : tantĂŽt la natalitĂ© en gĂ©nĂ©ral, tantĂŽt l’intĂ©rĂȘt de l’enfant en particulier.

Nous montrerons donc comment les femmes sont souvent placĂ©es dans une situation d’« abnĂ©gation forcĂ©e » dans le cadre du droit français de la reproduction en Ă©tudiant le rĂ©gime de l’assistance mĂ©dicale Ă  la procrĂ©ation, l’encadrement de l’avortement et les rĂ©centes Ă©volutions de l’ « accouchement sous X ».


Lionel Smith, Sir William C. Macdonald Chair in Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű: "Droit et pouvoir"

Monday, November 24, 2014, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

En droit civil quĂ©bĂ©cois, il existe une distinction fondamentale entre le droit subjectif et le pouvoir privĂ©, au point que l’on pourrait les qualifier de concepts opposĂ©s. Le droit correspond Ă  ce qui est dĂ©tenu au bĂ©nĂ©fice de son titulaire, tandis que le pouvoir est au bĂ©nĂ©fice d'autrui. Il semble que l'abnĂ©gation se concrĂ©tise par le rĂ©gime des pouvoirs. Ce rĂ©gime veille Ă  ce que ces derniers soient utilisĂ©s dans l'intĂ©rĂȘt d'autrui.

La common law connaĂźt trĂšs bien les concepts de droit et de pouvoir, mais diffĂ©remmentÌę: en tant que relations juridiques, tous deux peuvent ĂȘtre affectĂ©s soit au bĂ©nĂ©fice du titulaire, soit au bĂ©nĂ©fice d'autrui. ConformĂ©ment Ă  la cĂ©lĂšbre terminologie de W.N. Hohfeld (1879-1918), la common law connaĂźt quatre relations juridiques fondamentales : le droit, le pouvoir, le privilĂšge, et l’immunitĂ©. Chacune a son propre opposĂ©, et, chacune peut, en principe, exister tant au bĂ©nĂ©fice de son titulaire qu’au bĂ©nĂ©fice d'autrui, et ce, par le biais de la relation fiduciaire. Cet atelier propose donc une Ă©tude comparĂ©e de ces atomes juridiques dont il est possible de dĂ©cliner des molĂ©cules d'une complexitĂ© illimitĂ©e, incluant des rĂ©gimes juridiques altruistes.


Yann Favier, UniversitĂ© Rennes 2 - UniversitĂ© europĂ©enne de Bretagne: "Figures de l’abnĂ©gation en droit civil : le cas des relations familiales"

Friday, October 3, 2014, 13:00-14:30, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

L’abnĂ©gation, notion inconnue du droit civil mais relevant d’une forme d’effacement de soi pour autrui, est fortement sollicitĂ©e dans les relations familiales comme le moyen de prĂ©servation d’un intĂ©rĂȘt qui, sans ĂȘtre extĂ©rieur au sien, n’en demeure pas moins distinct de celui-ci : ainsi, il est fait rĂ©fĂ©rence Ă  l’intĂ©rĂȘt de la famille, d’un proche vulnĂ©rable, d’un ou d’une partenaire de vie, d’un enfant.

En ce sens, faire passer l’intĂ©rĂȘt d’autrui avant et de prĂ©fĂ©rence Ă  son propre intĂ©rĂȘt est moins une figure morale qu’une conception plus moderneÌęqu’on peut le penser deÌęl’intĂ©rĂȘt juridiquement protĂ©gĂ©. Cela est particuliĂšrement vĂ©rifiable dans le cas des relations familiales oĂč des obligations traditionnellement dĂ©terminĂ©es par la loi et de plus en plus par la convention, forment le coeur d’un droit flexible qui remet en question les catĂ©gories traditionnelles du droit civil.

Ìę

Les apparences en droit civil

Launch of "Les Apparences" in September 2015.

The 2012-2014 series of civil law workshops explored « Les apparences en droit civil ».

The workshops were presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages.

Each workshop was accredited for 1.5 hours of continuing legal education by the Barreau du Québec.


Bertrand StoffelBertrand Stoffel, University of Zurich: "Appearance and evidence: Is the proof in the pudding?"

Friday, April 4, 2014, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall


Abstract: Appearance plays a major role in civil evidence. Certainly, the judge may sometimes rely on science to prove facts. Often however, the judge will have to base her judgment on what appears to her as true or false.

In private law, proof is the demonstration of an alleged fact. It is the process that will lead the judge to the intimate conviction of the existence of the fact. But what, then, are the criteria for the establishment of such demonstration? To a large extent, the judge will rely on her own experience to establish the existence of a fact. She will review documents, hear statements, and inspect locations. All this will put the fact in evidence: It will make it appear as true or false.

The evidence—or appearance—of a fact will always be provisional. That is to say, no matter how many pieces of evidence are available, one can never be sure that this is exactly how the fact happened. Indeed, to the observer, the fact evidenced will remain an isolated fact. Moreover, the appearance of that fact will be that which the observer, in his own position and with his own experience, will perceive.

This atelier will explore how proof in private law can be a matter of appearance and how it relies on observation and probability. Reliance on observation is not without problems. Observation will disturb the facts, suppressing some of them and putting others in front. In the same vein, the judge will need to base her findings on her experience of life in order to establish the probability of a fact, thus linking proof with considerable uncertainty and subjectivity.


RĂ©gine TremblayRĂ©gine Tremblay, University of Toronto: "Sans foi ni loi: Appearances of Conjugality and Lawless Love"

Friday, January 24, 2014, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall


Abstract (In French only): L’auteure propose un survol historique du traitement des conjoints de fait en droit civil quĂ©bĂ©cois. Elle dĂ©fend qu’hier comme aujourd’hui, la non-reconnaissance de ce type d’unions dans le Code civil du QuĂ©bec repose davantage sur une dĂ©sapprobation ancrĂ©e dans d’autres ordres normatifsÌę: la religion et l’économie. Cependant, ce type d’unions produit de nombreux effets juridiques en droit privĂ© comme en droit public. Cette situation crĂ©e une apparence de conjugalitĂ© et ne peut que confondre le justiciable.


BĂ©atrice Kan-BalivetBĂ©atrice Kan-Balivet, UniversitĂ© Jean Moulin Lyon 3, Assistant Director of the Institut de droit patrimonial et de l'immobilier (IDPI): "Apparences et administration du bien dÂčautrui"

Friday, November 29, 2013, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall


Abstract (in French only): La nĂ©cessitĂ© de recourir Ă  un tiers pour administrer ses biens est une constante exclusive de toute considĂ©ration spatiale ou temporelle, exacerbĂ©es dans nos sociĂ©tĂ©s contemporaines par la mondialisation et la mutation des patrimoines. Le droit objectif prĂ©sente ainsi une gamme Ă©tendue de dispositifs pour rĂ©pondre aux besoins d’un sujet de droit, qui ne veut, ne peut ou ne doit pas administrer ses biens. Les circonstances ayant justifiĂ© l’avĂšnement d’une thĂ©orie gĂ©nĂ©rale de l’administration du bien d’autrui dans le nouveau Code civil quĂ©bĂ©cois sont Ă©galement prĂ©sentes en droit français, sans pour autant qu’un tel axe de rĂ©flexion ait percĂ© dans le Code civil français, voire au niveau doctrinal. Si le contexte est similaire, le modĂšle unitaire de la technique avec pouvoir pose interrogation.

La difficile rĂ©ception de la fiducie dans les pays de la famille romano-germanique invite Ă  nouveau Ă  s’interroger sur les apparences de modĂšle unitaire de l’administration du bien d’autrui.

La lutte contre les apparences passe par l’établissement d’une diffĂ©renciation notionnelle des techniques d’administration du bien d’autrui. La technique avec pouvoir dans une acception juridique ne saurait faire oublier les techniques sans pouvoir, lesquelles lui sont antĂ©rieures et subsistent en droit positif, mĂȘme si elles sont plus frustes. La propriĂ©tĂ©-gestion nĂ©cessite en effet un transfert de propriĂ©tĂ© pour administrer lesdits biens, tandis que l’avancĂ©e Ă  consister avec la dĂ©tention-gestion, Ă  ne remettre ses biens qu’en possession au sens du droit romain, l’administrĂ© en conservant la propriĂ©tĂ©. La diffĂ©rence est sensible, l’administrateur n’est alors plus titulaire d’un pouvoir, mais d’un droit.

Cette diffĂ©renciation notionnelle n’est pas sans enjeux puisqu’elle induit une diffĂ©renciation fonctionnelle. Chaque mode de gestion rĂ©alise en effet un Ă©quilibre propre entre les deux impĂ©ratifs de gestion que sont, le dynamisme de la gestion et la protection des intĂ©rĂȘts en prĂ©sence. Historiquement, c’est d’ailleurs la prise de conscience de ces fonctions qui explique le dĂ©clin ou la «ÌęrĂ©apparitionÌę» de certaines techniques. Selon la technique utilisĂ©e, par exemple, l’étendue des prĂ©rogatives de l’administrateur ou encore les risques encourus par l’administrĂ© ne sont pas les mĂȘmes.

La lutte contre les apparences en matiĂšre d’administration du bien d’autrui s’inscrit en consĂ©quence dans une dĂ©marche fondamentale avec des enjeux qui ne sont pas seulement thĂ©oriques.


Adrian PopoviciAdrian Popovici, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű: "Le mandat apparent"

Friday, September 20, 2013, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall


Abstract (in French only): Le mandat apparent est le joyau des phĂ©nomĂšnes juridiques que l’on peut regrouper sous le titre de la thĂ©orie de l’apparence en droit civil. Un rappel des rĂšgles qui le gouvernent et de sa raison d’ĂȘtre peut ouvrir la voie vers d’autres concepts collatĂ©raux encore peu explorĂ©s : les contrats fictifs, imposĂ©s, prĂ©sumĂ©s, les contrats-sanctions, etc
 Tout ça pour stimuler la rĂ©surrection du quasi-contrat, nouvelle vague; quasi-contrat rĂ©alitĂ© ou hĂ©rĂ©sie?


Ross AndersonRoss Anderson, University of Glasgow: "Security over Intangibles: Appearance and Reality"

Friday, April 5, 2013, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall


Abstract: What do incorporeals looks like? Their qualities are substantive, not physical. That is true of all rights in all systems. But civil lawyers, it seems, can see what common lawyers do not. The institutional structure of the civil law – persons, obligations, property – together with general patrimonial principles (such as the numerus clausus, the publicity and specificity principles) means civil lawyers know real rights and limited real rights when they encounter them. The division between real rights and personal rights, inherent in the institutional structure, plays a central role in the law of security interests. It is this simplicity, indeed, that is one of the great attractions of the civil law approach to private law.

Perhaps because of its antiquity, its weight of authority, and relative rationality, however, the basic civilian concepts, particularly in the law of security, are all too readily asserted rather than explained. There has not, in general, been the same critical reflection so characteristic of much modern discourse on proprietary security interests in the common law. Those common law responses, on the whole, demonstrate much practical, if ad hoc, ingenuity. But this ingenuity has not been matched by intelligibility.

Coherence has long been a civil law attribute. But even the great civil codes were not always coherent, particularly on technical points involving ownership and security. The codes were composed at a time when land was the paradigm asset and intangibles were, for commercial purposes, dealt with in the commercial codes and, in particular, in the law of negotiable instruments. The result has been the perception of conservatism. The lack of systematic review has sometimes resulted in only piecemeal amendments. The recent review of moveable security law in Scotland has given one opportunity – in an English speaking system rooted, in this area, in the civil law – for wholesale reflection.

In this context I consider, three points: the theory of limited rights as applied to claims and IPRs; the specificity principle; and the publicity principle. The appearance of civil law coherence is shown to be, in places, illusory. Building on the work of George Gretton, however, I suggest that a more coherent approach to basic patrimonial principles brings a clarity to the structure of the law. And it is these doctrinal improvements that allow us to focus on translating our theory into the reality of ordinary financial transactions.


Daniel JutrasDaniel Jutras, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű: « Que personne ne bouge! La confiance lĂ©gitime comme source d’obligations en droit civil »

Friday, January 18, 2013, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

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Silvia Ferreri, University of Turin: "The Appearance of Ownership: Sale of Another's Property (An Independent Version in Italy)"

Friday, November 16, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Abstract: The Italian provision corresponding to the French “possession vaut titre” (art. 2279 of the French Code Civil) does not distinguish between stolen or lost goods, and goods entrusted to a person who has failed to keep them in safe custody for the owner (see art. 1153 Italian civil code). This change occurred in 1942, when a new code replaced the previous one, which was a faithful 19th century reproduction of the French Code Napoleon.

There are some explanations for this innovation (which places Italy in an isolated position in comparison with neighbouring countries in Europe): the distinction was not easily enforced in court, many exceptions applied, and it was not soundly established in the Roman tradition. The result is unfortunate: Italy has become a privileged market for stolen goods imported from abroad. Switzerland and Germany still distinguish how the goods left the owner’s possession.

There are at least two interesting international cases to mention: French Ministry of Culture v. Italian Ministry of Culture and De Contessini, Cass. 24thÌę November 1995, n. 12166 and Casa della cultura ecuadoriana c. Danusso, Trib. Torino, March 23°, 1982. They reach opposite results as far as the restitution of an illegally imported good is concerned. Why did the distinction exist previously? We have to go back to the Roman rule (nemo dat quod non habet) and to the competing Germanic rule (Hand wahre Hand): the latter won in the period of the jus commune (prior to the French revolution), and passed into the French codification. But the distinction was never felt strongly in the Romanistic environment, and in 1942 Italy broke away from the rest of the European codifications. Unfortunately the requirement of good faith on the part of the buyer is presumed (according to a specific rule of the Italian code: art. 1147); this puts the burden of proof of the lack of good faith on the shoulders of the plaintiff, and it means that sometimes stolen goods cannot be recovered. There are some further rules to be considered that introduce some safeguards for “cultural goods” and provide some opportunity to recover them: Codice dei Beni Culturali (D.Lgs. 42/2004, art. 64); 1970 UNESCO convention: Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural PropertyÌę (Paris, 1970); UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, (Rome, 24 June 1995), in force since 1998 (5 ratifications); Council Directive No 93/7/EEC governing the return ofÌę cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State; Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 laying down provisions on the export of cultural goods.


Eric Descheemaeker, University of Edinburgh: "Truth and Truthfulness in the Law of Defamation"

Wednesday, October 3, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Abstract: This paper provides a comparative overview of two related, but analytically distinct, issues in the law of defamation. The first is whether the true character of a defamatory statement relieves the defendant from liability. On this issue, the civilian and common-law traditions have historically settled on two markedly different stances, the latter accepting the sufficiency of truth simpliciter while the former never did. Some of the reasons for this distinction are explored. Different is the issue of truthfulness, in the sense of belief in truth. Does it, and should it matter, that a defendant believed that what they said was true albeit (prima facie) defamatory? Should we distinguish on the basis of the ‘quality’ of the belief? This paper argues that reasonable truthfulness ought to be recognised as a defence in the law of defamation. De lege lata, the law has never come up with such a general principle, but observation suggests that it has in fact been beating about the bush for a long time, using other analytical tools. Besides, a number of recent developments internationally can be understood as attempts to get closer to the above position.

Les intraduisibles en droit civil Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The 2010-2012 series of civil law workshops presented by the Paul-AndrĂ© CrĂ©peau Centre for Private and Comparative Law (formerly the Quebec Research Centre of Private & Comparative Law) explore law’s intraduisibles (elements or aspects which lie beyond translation).

This year, the workshops are presented with financial assistance from Justice Canada’s Support Fund for Access to Justice in Both Official Languages.

The workshops are recognized as part of the mandatory continuing legal education requirements of the Barreau du Québec.

The Centre has recently published to commemorate the workshops.


Past Workshops

Christine Morin: "Le testament: une traduction de?"

April 13, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The eleventh workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Christine Morin.

Abstract: What does a testator seek to express when arranging for the devolution of his property in a will? His sentiments? his duties? his solidarity? his affections? What does the legislature seek to express by leaving the testator free to bequeath his property to whomever he chooses, or, on the contrary, when limiting this freedom? A legal tradition? moral values? social solidarity? Is the depiction of society that emerges from the Civil Code of QuĂ©bec’s treatment of wills the same as that emerging from the legislation of the other provinces?


Ruth Sefton-Green: "Why Remedies is not a Legal Subject in Civil(ian) Law"

March 23, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The tenth workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Ruth Sefton-Green.

Abstract: The aim of the presentation is to focus on the absence of remedies and the pre-eminence of rights in civil law. More precisely, we need to explore whether it is the concept of remedies that is lacking in civilian law (with a focus on French law), or just the language of remedies. Dr Sefton-Green’s working hypothesis is that the concept is missing; civil law does not think in terms of remedies; there is no legal categorization of remedies. If this is so, the gap is conceptually embedded and is not just a question of language.

Furthermore, if remedies are absent, what does this tell us about the nature of rights (droits subjectifs) in civil law? Can inferences be drawn about the relationship between rights and obligations? If remedies are absent, does this mean that wrongs are absent as well? Or is there a way to square the circle?

Finally, the quest for remedies in civil law is inevitably linked to an enquiry into the dual relationship between the parties (and their respective rights) in private law and the triangular relationship between the parties and the judge. The pre-eminence of rights and the absence of remedies in civil law, paralleled by the presence of remedies in the common law, will impact on these two relationships.


Jimena Andino Dorato: "L'Autre faute"

March 2, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The ninth workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Jimena Andino Dorato.

Abstract: Assuming that translation is possible -- but without denying the inherent difficulties of that process -- this presentation examines the notion of fault in Quebec law, beginning with questions raised by its translation. The point of departure of this exercise brings us to the difficulties faced by translators and editors working on the Spanish version of the trilingual Civil Code of QuĂ©bec. The goal is to examine how these difficulties in translation may aid a renewed understanding of fault in Quebec law. For that, it will be necessary to return to French law, an important source for the laws of Quebec and Latin America, focusing, in particular, on the various interpretations it has received. From this examination of the Other, we will move to an intra-civilian analysis of the “text of departure”, the “text of arrival”, and the family of civil law. This will help establish a third perspective that will remove us from the usual English - French, common law - civil law binary approach, allowing an examination of familiar and foreign laws in a manner that will reveal neither to be wholly familiar or foreign.


Eric H. Reiter: "Translating the Untranslatable: Historical Aspects of the Protection of Honour, Bodily Integrity, and Other Extrapatrimonial Interests in Quebec Civil Law"

January 20, 2012, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The eighth workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Eric H. Reiter.

Abstract: This workshop is a historical look at the slow development of extrapatrimonial personality rights in Quebec law, from the later 19th century to the Civil Code of QuĂ©bec. With its stated aim to affirm and protect the dignity of the human person, the later 20th-century recodification of private law brought personality rights into the civil code for the first time. Long before this, however, litigants attempted to use the law and the courts to protect intangible and abstract human qualities like honour, bodily integrity, and familial affection. Their attempts – creative and often sophisticated, if not always successful – illustrate some of the obstacles to and conceptual changes behind the development of extrapatrimonial rights in Quebec civil law.


Kirsten Anker: "Aboriginal Rights in Quebec: Always Sui Generis?"

November 23, 2011, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The seventh workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Kirsten Anker.

Abstract: “Aboriginal Title” makes up part of the law of Quebec, but it always comes in borrowed clothes. Existing in pockets of federal law, Aboriginal title sends us to the language of the common law, or to the sui generis concept that is the reconciliation of common law and aboriginal perspectives. Historic accommodations of Aboriginal tenure in Quebec employ a now-defunct set of concepts. Ethnographically, traditional tenure can not be translated from indigenous laws to the terms of civil law without losing much. Discussing the New Relationship Agreement 2008 (Paix des Braves) that now uses traditional Cree “traplines” as a unit of forestry management in Quebec, this presentation will consider the risks and benefits of the sui generis interest in land.


Dr Anne Sanders: "Prenuptial Agreements, Comparative Law and the Notion of Contract"

September 14, 2011, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The sixth workshop in the 2010/2012 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will be given by Dr Anne Sanders.

Abstract: The recent UK Supreme Court decision of Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42 has brought prenuptial agreements into the focus of not only English family law, but comparative law too.

Although the majority of the justices considered irrelevant the question whether prenuptial agreements should be understood as contracts, the argument made here is that the different notions of contract in English and German law may help to explain why such agreements have not been enforced for so long in England and what comparative contract law can learn from the notion of prenuptial agreements in the different legal systems.


Jean-Guy Belley: "Contrat et confiance. Traduire le fait relationnel en droit civil"

March 11, 2011, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The fifth workshop in the 2010/2011 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” will was given by professor Jean-Guy Belley.
Abstract (only available in French): Quelle est la traduction/qualification juridique adĂ©quate de la relation d’affaires entre un franchiseur et ses franchisĂ©s : contrat innomĂ© imposant une obligation de loyautĂ©? relation fiduciaire dĂ©coulant de la vulnĂ©rabilitĂ© du partenaire ? relation de confiance ? relation d’interdĂ©pendance asymĂ©trique? D’oĂ» vient la difficultĂ© de traduire/qualifier la relation de franchise en droit, plus particuliĂšrement en droit civil : des mots disponibles et autorisĂ©s? des particularitĂ©s de cette forme d’organisation Ă©conomique? du paradigme classique , libĂ©ral, du droit privĂ©? À quel genre dont la franchise serait une espĂšce peut-on se rĂ©fĂ©rer pour dĂ©finir juridiquement cette relation?


Alexandra Popovici: "Translation as foundation: trusts in Quebec civil law"

February 11, 2011, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The fourth workshop in the 2010/2011 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” was given by Alexandra Popovici, graduate student at UniversitĂ© Laval and researcher at the Paul-AndrĂ© CrĂ©peau Centre for Private and Comparative Law (formerly the Quebec Research Centre of Private & Comparative Law). Using the story of the Quebec trust as an illustration of a translation of an intraduisible, this workshop was an occasion to reflect on the fundamental nature of translation in the creation of legal thought.
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Professor François Ost: "Intraduisible? Qu'entendez-vous par là?"

January 24, 2011, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

The third workshop in the 2010/2011 series “Les intraduisibles en droit civil” was given by Professor François Ost, vice-chancellor at the FacultĂ©s universitaires Saint-Louis, Belgium. As a philosopher of language, François Ost reflected on what it means for something to be “untranslatable”. He argued for the necessarily imperfect character of translation (as is the case with respect to language itself), dismissing in this way two simplifying theses: that of “omnitranslatability” and that of the impossibility of translation. As a philosopher of law, he then explored comparative law’s particular function as a type of translation.


Professor Giorgio Resta: "The Commodification of Personality Rights: A Comparative Perspective"

November 24, 2010, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

This second workshop was given by Professor Giorgio Resta, Associate Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Bari, Italy (since 2002) and Visiting Professor (2010/2011) at the Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű.

This workshop explored the legal issues surrounding an increasingly important problem: the commodification of personal identity. What are the historical roots of the category of “personality rights” that appear, for example, in Title 2, Book One of the Civil Code of QuĂ©bec? Does the English word “personality” represent a perfect equivalent of the French personnalitĂ©, of the German Persönlichkeit, or of the Portuguese personalidade? And what is the relationship with the competing notion of “privacy”, not only in terms of conceptual taxonomies, but also with regard to the operational rules? The most recent scholarship in this area has suggested that there is a “transatlantic clash” between two western cultures of privacy, one rooted in the idea of liberty and the other in the idea of dignity. Has this difference in approach led to two (or more) different models of regulation?


Professor Richard Hyland: "Is the Gift a Contract?"

October 8, 2010, 12:30-2:00, room 202, New Chancellor Day Hall

Les intraduisibles en droit civil

This first workshop of the academic year was given by Professor Richard Hyland, Distinguished Professor at Rutgers Law School. Among many other publications, Professor Hyland is the author of Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) a book that has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention.

A chapter of Gifts: A Study in Comparative Law can be consulted via (subscription required).

"The Civil Law and its Codes: Journey Through the Americas"

Journey Through the Americas

The Quebec Research Centre of Private and Comparative (now known as the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law) and the Grupo Hispano de la Facultad del Derecho co-organized the 2009-2010 Civil Law Workshops on the theme of "The Civil Law and its Codes: Journey Through the Americas"

November 16, 2009
Prof. Olivier Moreteau,
"De revolutionibus ... la place du code civil en Louisiane et dans l'univers du droit quatre cents ans aprĂšs Copernic"

December 7, 2009, 12:30PM to 2:00PM
Jimena Andino Dorato, Nelcy LĂłpez Cuellar and Graciela Jasa-Silveira,
"The place of the Civil Code in dialogue with the Constitution"
Room 16, Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal
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January 15, 2010, 3:30PM to 5:00PM
Prof. Luis Muñiz ArgĂŒelles,
"On Conditions Favoring Recodification: A Comparison of the Puerto Rican and Argentine Attempts with the Quebec Civil code Revision"
Room 16, Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal

February 15, 2010, 12:30PM to 2:00PM
Sophie Morin,
"Identités et codes civilistes"
Room 202, New Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal

March 15, 2010, 12:30PM to 2:00PM
Prof. Julio CĂ©sar Rivera,
"Le Code Civil : son rÎle comme source de droit privé argentin"
Room 202, New Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal
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April 9, 2010, 12:30PM to 2:00PM
Prof. José AntÎnio Gediel,
"L'émergence des droits de la personnalité en droit civil brésilien: le corps humain et son statut juridique actuel"
Room 202, New Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal

May 19, 2010, 12:30PM to 2:00PM
Prof. BenoĂźt Moore,
"Rapport synthĂšse"
Room 202, New Chancellor-Day Hall
Faculty of Law, ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű
3644 Peel Street, Montreal
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"Trusts in Civil Law"

As part of the Civil Law Workshops Series for 2008-2009, the Quebec Research Centre of Private and Comparative Law (now known as the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law) organized a series of conferences around the theme of "Trusts in Civil Law". The aim of this series was to study how different civilian traditions around the world conceptualize the Trust.

These workshops took place from 11:30 AM – 1:00 PM in Room 202 of Chancellor Day Hall located at 3644 Peel Street, Montreal.

September 12, 2008
F. BarriĂšre
(Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II)
"La fiducie ou le réveil chaotique de la Belle au bois dormant"

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November 21, 2008
M. McAuley
(Trusts Practice Group, Appleby, Bermuda)
"Truth and Reconciliation : Notions of Property in Louisiana's Civil and Trust Codes"

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January 19, 2009
J. Talpis (Université de Montréal)
M. Graziadei (University of Turin)
"Recognition of Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Jurisdictions"

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February 13, 2009
A. Hofri-Winogradow
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
"Trusts in Israel/Palestine: A Chequered History"

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March 6, 2009
M. Cantin Cumyn
(ÀŠ°óSMÉçÇű)
"Réflexions autour de la diversité des modes de réception du trust dans les pays de droit civil"

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May 1, 2009
L. Ho
(University of Hong Kong)
"Trusts in China: Property or Contract?"

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Previous Civil Law Workshops have also led to various publications:

The CrĂ©peau Centre thanks theÌę and theÌęÌęfor their financial support.

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