捆绑SM社区

Invisible Hand, Visible Impact: Unlocking the Role of Competition in Reducing Inequality

The annual聽Jack Layton Prize for a Better Canada聽in partnership with the Douglas-Coldwell-Layton Foundation is a essay competition for 捆绑SM社区 graduate students. This year鈥檚 winning essay, titled 鈥淚nvisible Hand, Visible Impact 鈥 Unlocking the Role of Competition and Reducing Inequality,鈥 penned by MPP students聽Chloe Aboud and Sean Celi, underscores the pressing need for policies that foster competition within the Canadian economy.

Expensive airfares that from seeing dying loved ones, high grocery prices that force Canadians to and the ability of firms within the same industry to simultaneously of Canadian employees are just some of the grim socioeconomic realities caused by lack of competition.聽

Adam Smith posited that the price mechanism functions as an invisible hand, orchestrating market transactions and allocating resources with efficiency. However, beneath this hand lies a vital force: competition. While the price mechanism serves as the guiding principle, competition propels its operation and sustains economic dynamism. When considering the benefits of competition, lower prices and innovation are oft-cited, yet its profound impact in reducing social and economic inequality is overlooked.聽

Competition policy and socioeconomic inequality are intrinsically linked. Equality considerations must be directly integrated within evaluation of anti-competitive behaviors, necessitating an expansion of competition laws to encompass targets for reducing inequality. This can be seen in South Africa, where competition legislation aligns explicitly with constitutional imperatives for affirmative action, empowering historically disadvantaged groups.聽

Across diverse jurisdictions such as the European Union, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan, competition laws aim to promote fairness, protect public interest, and enhance economic welfare. This is in contrast to Canada鈥檚 Competition Act where direct terminology like fairness is not included, focusing instead on While these provisions may not directly address inequality, they offer a framework for competition agencies to consider broader societal concerns when evaluating mergers. Consequently, measures that exacerbate inequality could face regulatory scrutiny, while those that tackle it may receive support. The failure of Canada鈥檚 competition policies to address inequality is evident in the growing corporate concentration in the country.鈥

High concentration in Canada鈥檚 key markets鈥

One commonly used metric that shows the amount of corporate concentration in an industry is the , which ranges from 0 to 10,000; a market with an HHI of less than 1,500 is considered a competitive marketplace, an HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 is moderately concentrated, and an HHI of 2,500 or greater is highly concentrated. In Canada, the average HHI has increased since 2002. The HHI of the top 10% most concentrated industries from 2,818 in 2005 to 3,060 in 2018. This signals a trend of increasing corporate concentration, especially in already highly concentrated industries.鈥

The is another measure of corporate concentration. CR4 measures the combined market share of the four largest firms. In early 2019, Canada鈥檚 telecom industry had a , which means Rogers, Bell, Telus, and Freedom Mobile made up 100% of the market in almost the entire country. After聽Rogers鈥 acquisition of Freedom in 2019, belonged to only three companies.鈥

Figure 1: Market Share of Telecoms in Canada (Source: Canadian Media Concentration Research Project)

Figure 1: Market Share of Telecoms in Canada (Source: )听

Canada鈥檚 grocery sector is also highly concentrated, with a CR4 ratio of . Most Canadians shop in one of Loblaws, Sobeys, or Metro, with each company having more than . Contributing to the growing concentration of the grocery sector is rapid consolidation in the industry. In 1986, there were eight major grocery chains in Canada. In the last two decades, five of them have been bought by today鈥檚 grocery giants. Loblaws acquired in 1998, in 2009, and in 2013. Similarly, Sobeys acquired IGA in 1998, in 2013, and in 2018. The result is an illusion of choice: Canadians are likely getting their skincare products, snacks, and fresh produce from the same parent company, despite shopping at different stores (see Figure 1).

Figure 2: Consolidation of the Grocery Sector (Source: Competition Bureau)

Figure 2: Consolidation of the Grocery Sector (Source: )听

Other industries related to the food supply chain are also increasingly concentrated. The food service industry has also become more concentrated. With mergers like and , the proportion of independent restaurants from 62% in 2011 to just 47% in 2023.鈥

Less discussed but equally alarming evidence of corporate concentration is the national decline in new businesses. As by the Business Development Bank of Canada, the number聽of entrepreneurs has declined by 100,000 in 20 years, despite the Canadian population growing by more than 10 million over the same timeframe. Figure 2 shows that exit rates have overtaken entry rates in the past decades, which is a sign that there are fewer new competitors that are willing to challenge the stronghold of big players.鈥

Figure 3: Business Entry and Exit Rates in Canada (Source: Statistics Canada)

Figure 3: Business Entry and Exit Rates in Canada (Source: )听

Examining the potential impact of competition policy on consumers鈥 reliance on infrastructure, product accessibility, and income inequality is crucial for understanding how solutions can be more encompassing to economic and social equality.鈥

Risk of overreliance鈥

High corporate concentration, where a few major players dominate an industry, can create dangerous over-reliance where consumers and businesses become dependent on these giants. The Rogers network in 2022 illustrates such danger. As one of the largest telecommunications providers, the widespread outage crippled phone, internet, and emergency services for close to 10 million Canadians. Interac was taken offline, rendering businesses nationwide unable to accept debit card transactions. Citizens were unable to access 911 services via mobile phones on the Rogers network. Public transport agencies encountered computer system issues, while government services such as the Canada Revenue Agency were impacted. This highlights the risk: if one company controls a significant portion of the economy鈥檚聽infrastructure, a single point of failure can have a cascading effect, disrupting essential services and causing economic hardship. The pervasive impact of corporate concentration on daily life and economic activity becomes blatantly clear.鈥

Reduced choice and accessibility concerns鈥

Corporate concentration significantly exacerbates inequality, and this can be seen in Canada鈥檚 transportation sector. Companies like Air Canada and VIA Rail dominating the industry leads to consumers facing limited options and higher prices for travel services. This lack of competition disproportionately affects marginalized communities, and those in remote or underserved regions who rely heavily on transportation services for healthcare, education, and employment opportunities. As dominant firms prioritize profitable routes and services, they may neglect less lucrative routes or regions, leaving communities isolated and underserved. Additionally, higher transportation costs create financial barriers for low-income individuals and families, limiting their mobility and access to essential services. The concentration of power in the transportation sector leaves additional room for exploitation, as firms can set unreasonably high prices when they know consumers have no or limited choice. Not only are limited choices leading to higher prices, but they may even be creating long-term harms by hindering access to employment, healthcare, and education for underserved populations.聽

Food insecurity聽

The growing concentration in the grocery and food service sectors correlates with the growing of Canadians, which, in this context, refers to the inadequate or insecure access to food due to financial constraints. In , 9.2% of Canadian families were food insecure. Now, experience this phenomenon. Furthermore, the majority of food insecure families in 2004 were below the poverty line, whereas the majority of food insecure families in 2022 were above it, suggesting that the cost of food is increasing more rapidly than wages. This becomes difficult to accept when paired with Competition Bureau鈥檚 findings that Canada鈥檚 largest groceries have on food in the last five years.鈥

Worse worker conditions聽

Growing corporate concentration also adversely affects workers. Data on the grocery sector shows that an increase in grocers鈥 profits occurred concurrently with declining wages. Specifically, grocery workers鈥 was $21.50/hour in 2020. Two years later, wages fell back to $19.61/hour, even though grocery chains鈥 profits during the same period. This decline in wages was largely because of Canada鈥檚 three largest grocers鈥 decision to simultaneously for frontline workers who kept stores running at the height of the pandemic. 鈥楾he Big Three鈥檚鈥 coordinated decision to cancel the bonus in June 2020, when Covid cases were continuing to climb, sparked allegations of , as Loblaw鈥檚 president admitted talking to competitors before announcing it publicly. In competitive markets, workers could respond to these wage cuts by finding a higher-paying job in the industry. However, in Canada's highly concentrated grocery industry, workers have limited bargaining power.聽

Concentration in the telecommunications industry has also harmed wages and workers鈥 conditions. In 2021, Rogers completed its, despite the Competition Bureau鈥檚 to block the merger, on the basis of it that are beneficial to Canadians. Instead, it saw Rogers laying off post-merger, and in 2023, Rogers after failed negotiations with the workers鈥 union. Although worker lay-offs occur in varied settings, sometimes irrespective of concentrated markets, the issue to note here is that cost 鈥渆fficiencies鈥 as a result of these lay-offs have not translated into lower prices. Early this year, Rogers announced plans to of their wireless plans by as high as $9 per month. The merger has therefore not only led to lay-offs, but also higher prices and short term employment insecurity for workers.鈥

Widening income gaps鈥犫

Lack of competition has also exacerbated income inequality in Canada. 1% of the richest Canadians make almost $180,000 more today than they did in 1982, during the same period. The Bank of Canada that growth in top executives鈥 pay is partly to blame for this. The 100 highest paid CEOs in Canada now make 鈥搕he highest it has ever been.It comes as no surprise that the highest paid CEOs in Canada are those in markets where competition is weak. In 2022, the second highest paid CEO in Canada was the CEO of Durham and Dye, a company ; the fourth highest paid was the CEO of Rogers, whose executives received after their successful acquisition of Shaw. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that lack of competition widens inequality through , since it transfers bargaining power from workers to firms.鈥

Solution 1: Empower the Competition Bureau to work for Canadians聽鈥

Compared to other competition authorities abroad, Canada鈥檚 Competition Bureau is limited in its power to stop anticompetitive behaviour. Since its creation in 1986, the Bureau has challenged a merger only 18 times. The Bureau has any of those challenges, including the Rogers-Shaw merger that it attempted to block after it found that the acquisition would .鈥

Currently, the Bureau has no power to issue orders. All it can do is refer prosecutions of criminal cases to federal courts or make applications for orders to the Competition Tribunal.鈥 For instance, in December 2023, the Competition Bureau had to obtain a just to start the process of investigating Rogers鈥 anticompetitive practices. In contrast, the has the power to independently compel firms to produce documents needed to conduct an investigation, pause any merger transactions, and enter into premises without any warrant. The Bureau needs a similar level of power for it to work for Canadians. This increased power would not necessarily remove the need for the Competition Tribunal. Just like in the UK, even with the Bureau鈥檚 increased powers, businesses would still be able to challenge decisions made by the Bureau by to the Competition Tribunal.鈥

To give the Competition Bureau more teeth, it also needs better funding. In 2023, the Bureau had an operating budget of , equivalent to $1.67 per capita, which is way behind the world鈥檚 leading competition authorities. In comparison, the budget of Australia鈥檚 competition authority had a per-capita funding of in 2023, while New Zealand鈥檚 had a per-capita funding of 鈥 Empirical studies have found that , competition enforcement becomes stronger. When taken with other studies that show that , it is easy to see how a Bureau with stronger enforcement powers can help promote fairness for Canadians.聽

Solution 2: Prioritize structural remedies to prevent harmful mergers聽

When it comes to addressing the impacts of a merged entity, there are generally at our disposal: non-structural or 鈥渂ehavioral鈥 remedies, which target how a merged entity conducts its business, and 鈥渟tructural鈥 remedies, which focus on restoring competition through direct structural changes with measures such as asset divestiture.鈥

To ease the burden on consumers caused by past mergers, the Competition Bureau should prioritize and enforce more structural remedies to reverse the harms created by existing merged entities. Instead of behavioral remedies which are easier to circumvent and require ongoing monitoring, compelling firms to divest certain assets in existing concentrated markets, or as part of requirements for new mergers to go through,. Strengthening merger reviews with this priority in mind brings a more active effort on the part of authorities, and is a more reliable means to create new competitors, strengthen existing ones, and restore a more competitive landscape.鈥犫

Although structural remedies are preferred and a best practice internationally, they could be made stricter, and more effective. For example, in 2013, , following approval from the Competition Bureau. The Bureau raised concerns about the merger's potential impact on competition in the retail sale of grocery products, prompting Sobeys to agree to sell these stores to address these concerns. Despite the divestitures, Sobeys still gained 190 supermarket locations overall from the Safeway acquisition, begging the question of whether this deal was proportional or effective in maintaining competition in the market. While the sale of these stores could potentially preserve competition by preventing Sobeys from gaining excessive market power in certain local markets, a relatively small number of stores may not fully address the broader competitive concerns raised by the merger.聽

Solution 3: Reduce barriers to entry to give everyone a fair chance to compete鈥

Tackling lack of competition requires more than changes to the Bureau or the Competition Act. A big reason for the decline in the number of new entrepreneurs in Canada are in many markets. These include barriers beyond policymakers鈥 control, such as high capital costs and technological capacity. But these barriers could also be government-imposed regulations. In Canada, businesses must abide by official language regulations, licensing requirements, and restrictions against foreign-owned businesses. Because many of these regulations are imposed by different levels of government, reducing barriers to entry requires a whole-of-government approach. For instance, when it comes to helping businesses meet official language requirements, the Quebec government offers a to help small and medium-sized businesses overcome the high costs of language requirements. Applying this model on a national scale can significantly reduce barriers to entry for entrepreneurs across the country.鈥

Canada鈥檚 most concentrated industries, such as the telecoms industry, have strict federal regulations that restrict the entry of foreign competitors. The outdated requires that any telecom entity that represents at least 10% of the market must be owned by a Canadian, and that at least 80% of their board and voting shares must be Canadian. As can be seen through the against telecom companies, the Canadian ownership requirement for telecom companies has not necessarily translated into real benefits for Canadians. Removing the requirement for Canadian ownership, while still maintaining the minimum threshold for Canadian board members and voting shares, will go a long way in encouraging new entrants into the Canadian market.鈥

Towards a fairer tomorrow鈥

think that it is currently too easy for big businesses to take advantage of consumers and that there thus needs to be more competition in the country. The recommendations highlighted above鈥揳 Competition Bureau with stronger enforcement powers, a system that prioritizes structural remedies, and a significant reduction in barriers to entry鈥揷an directly address Canadians鈥 concerns. These recommendations will help reduce inequality as they can expand workers鈥 bargaining power, increase wages, lower prices, and provide Canadians with more choice over their everyday purchases.聽

Last year鈥檚 are great signs that Canada is recognizing that its 38-year-old competition policy regime is due for a change. As Canadians demand more competition, the Canadian government must remember that the pursuit of greater competition isn't just a policy imperative鈥攊t's a fundamental driver of a thriving, fairer, and equitable society.聽

Presented by Interac

惭础齿听笔辞濒颈肠测听and the Policy Lab are supported by Interac, Canada's most trusted payment system.

MAX Policy

惭础齿听Policy聽is a collection of provocative ideas and policy solutions generated by the minds at the Max Bell School of Public Policy.

Events

There are currently no events available.

Twitter

Back to top